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Act Not A Burden On
Interstate Commerce
The principal legal arguments levelled
against segregation, and those which have
received the most notoriety, concern viola-
tions of the due process and equal pro-
tection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment.' But it is another section of the
Constitution, the commerce clause,-' which
is becoming increasingly important among
the constitutional questions to be answered
in the present civil rights conflict.:,
Ironically, the commerce clause has been
utilized as an argument to justify discrim-
ination. An example is the principal case
wherein Marlon Green, a Negro, applied
for the position of pilot with an interstate
air carrier. Although he was ostensibly
qualified to fill the position, his applica-
tion for the carrier's training school was
rejected. Green informed Colorado's Anti-
Discrimination Commission of this action
and the Commission found that Green was
rejected because of his race which amounted
to a violation of the state's Anti-Discrimina-
tion Act.4 The air carrier was ordered to
1 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl.3.
3 See N.Y. Times, June 20, 1963, p. 1, col. 8.
-1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §80-24-6 (Supp. 1960)
declares that "It shall be discriminatory or unfair
employment practice: (2) For an employer to
refuse to hire .. . any person otherwise qualified,
cease the discrimination and to give Green
another opportunity to enroll. The Supreme
Court of Colorado, contrary to the Com-
mission's order, declared that this statute,
through which the Commission received
its power, placed an undue burden on
interstate commerce and occupied an area
pre-empted by federal legislation. The
United States Supreme Court, in reversing,
unanimously held that the Colorado statute
to prevent discrimination in hiring on
account of race does not impose a con-
stitutionally prohibited burden upon inter-
state commerce. Colorado Anti-Discrimina-
tion Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.,
372 U.S. 714 (1963).
An early interpretation of the commerce
clause attempted to repose all authority
affecting interstate commerce in Congress
thereby impliedly prohibiting any state
regulation.5 Within thirty years this inter-
pretation was succeeded by a theory of
concurrent powers which allowed, and pre-
sently allows, a state to regulate an area
of interstate commerce that does not re-
quire uniform rules." The states, however,
because of race, creed, color, national origin or
ancestry."
For a collection and analysis of similar Fair Em-
ployment Practice Acts see 36 NOTRE DAME LAW.
189 (1961).
- Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
"[T]hat a state may regulate commerce ... can-
not be admitted." Id. at 199; Dowling, Interstate
Commerce And State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1
(1940).
11 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
298 (1851).
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were not given unbridled power to regulate
this non-uniform area. For instance, a state
could not regulate an area which was exclu-
sively subject to federal legislation. 7 Fur-
thermore, state regulation could not be
economically discriminatory"; nor could it
impose an undue burden on commerceY
The question of whether a state regula-
tion creates an undue burden on commerce
must be determined on an ad hoc basis.
A court, in making such a determination,
will weigh the regulation's promotion of
local interests against the extent to which
it restricts the free flow of interstate com-
merce or, stated differently, the extent to
which it interferes in an area where na-
tional uniformity is necessary. For example,
in Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel.
Sullivan,'0 the State of Arizona, intending
to increase railroad safety, enacted laws
which limited the length of railroad trains
passing within its jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court weighed the effect of the statute
on transportation efficiency and economy
against the safety value of the regulation. It
concluded that the regulation exceeded
what was essential for safety "since it does
not appear that it will lessen . . . the
danger of accident."'- This process of
weighing the effect of local interests against
interstate commerce has also been em-
ployed with respect to laws that protect the
7See Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S.
202 (1944); South Carolina State Highway Dep't
v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
8 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S.
349 (1951) (a state statute cannot discriminate
against interstate commerce if reasonable nondis-
criminatory alternatives adequate to conserve
legitimate local interests are available).
9 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520
(1959).
10325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945).
11Id. at 781-82.
health, safety and welfare of the com-
munity; and in many instances, these laws
have been upheld.'-'
State laws either requiring or prohibiting
segregation have also been tested against
commerce clause objections." In Hall v.
DeCuir," a Louisiana statute requiring in-
tegration on riverboats was held to violate
the commerce clause. The Court reasoned
that the riverboats could not efficiently
operate if each state bordering the Missis-
sippi enacted different legislation pertaining
to accommodations. Inconvenience would
occur, the Court stated, through the reloca-
tion of passengers. This inconvenience was
held to be a direct burden on interstate com-
merce in an area which needed uniformity
of regulation. Approximately seventy years
later, in Morgan v. Virginia,15 the Court
utilized the Hall rationale in invalidating a
state statute requiring segregation on in-
terstate buses while passing through Vir-
ginia.
A state statute that conflicts with federal
'E.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (control of dense
black smoke from docked ships); H.P. Welch
Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939)
(regulation on the number of consecutive driving
hours).
13 The regulation need not be the product of a
state legislature to be constitutionally objection-
able. Railroad and bus regulations have also been
held to violate the commerce clause. Chance v.
Lambeth, 186 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1951); White-
side v. Southern Bus Lines, Inc., 177 F.2d 949
(6th Cir. 1949).
1495 U.S. (5 Otto) 485 (1877).
1, 328 U.S. 373 (1946). As to why the Morgan
case was not decided under the Interstate Com-
merce Act see Pollak, The Supreme Court and
the States: Reflections on Boynton v. Virginia,
49 CALIF. L. REV. 15, 38-39 (1961). Bob-Lo
Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948)
is the third of three cases decided by the Supreme
Court concerning commerce clause objections to
anti-discrimination statutes.
legislation" or intrudes in a field Congress
intended to occupy exclusively is invalid. 7
If Congress does not clearly manifest an
intent to exclude all state legislation,16 or
if the statute is not in conflict with federal
law,1' the Court will be reluctant to strike
down the state law."' State statutes that
are identical to federal legislation and which
cover subjects omitted by federal legislation
have been upheld so long as no conflict
appears possible2 1 and pre-emption was not
intended.
Federal legislation is non-existent within
the area of discrimination and employment
practices. Executive orders, however, have
required government contractors to re-
1' U.S. CONST. art. VI. cl. 2 (supremacy clause);
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148
(1942). "But where the United States exercises
its power of legislation as to conflict with the
state . . . the state legislation becomes inopera-
tive . " Id. at 155-56.
17 See, e.g., Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd.,
353 U.S. 1, 10 (1957); Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S.
383, 390 (1951).
'S Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902).
19Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)
wherein the state of Indiana required producers
of medicine for domestic animals to label the in-
gredients on each package. The purpose of the
statute was to prevent a fraud on the people of
the state. The federal government also had legis-
lation forbidding the introduction of adulterated
or misbranded food into commerce. The federal
legislation did not require a recital of the in-
gredients, except in specific areas like morphine,
opium, etc. The Court found that Congress did
not pre-empt the field since it limited the scope
of its statutory prohibitions and consequently did
not include those safeguards at which the Indiana
statute was aimed.
20 See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, supra note 12, at 446.
21 California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949). A
state law identical with federal legislation will be
struck down when national uniformity is the
policy of the federal law.
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frain from discriminatory hiring practices .2-2
Many states, in contrast, have enacted
legislation prohibiting discrimination in this
area.21 These acts apply to all firms within
the states' jurisdiction, including those that
are active in interstate commerce. No chal-
lenge on commerce clause grounds had
been brought before the Supreme Court
prior to the principal case.
2 4
The Court, in the case under discussion,
unanimously held that the Colorado statute
did not unduly burden interstate commerce
and that federal legislation had not pre-
empted the field of fair employment prac-
tices in air transportation. In discussing the
first point, the Court remarked that the
facts of each case determine whether a
state regulation is unduly burdensome. With
this in mind, the Court felt that the circum-
stances before it did not amount to those
present both in Hall and Morgan. Further-
more, the Court regarded the fair employ-
ment statute as localized matter and, more
significantly, stated that the "threat of
diverse and conflicting regulation of hiring
practices is virtually nonexistent. -2 5
An analysis of this quotation is war-
ranted. When Hall and Morgan were de-
cided, statutes authorizing segregation were
22 The most recent executive order in this area is
Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977
(1961). As the principal case points out, 372 U.S.
714, 723-24, various federal laws have been
passed forbidding discrimination in air transpor-
tation. These enactments, however, are not di-
rected toward fair employment practices.
2- See 36 NOTRE DAME LAW. 189 n.3 (1961).
24 In Railway Mail Ass'n. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88
(1945), the Supreme Court held that Section 43
of the New York Civil Rights Law was not an
interference with the association's right of selec-
tion of membership or with its liberty to contract.
The decision rested solely on the fourteenth
amendment.
25 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Con-
tinental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 721 (1963).
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not unconstitutional and hence, different
states could pass conflicting legislation con-
cerning segregation. With the advent of the
Brown v. Board of Educ. interpretation
of the fourteenth amendment,2 G it was set-
tled that any legislation requiring segrega-
tion is invalid. Consequently, the rationale
of both Hall and Morgan are no longer
applicable and respondent air carrier
could not reasonably argue that a state
other than Colorado could pass contrary
legislation regarding discrimination in em-
ployment practices. The Court's conclusion
is that Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act
will not conflict with any other state's fair
employment statute to such an extent as to
result in an undue burden.
The Court, in discussing the second
issue of whether the Federal Aviation Act 27
had pre-empted the discrimination field,
noted that the act was directed at price
discrimination. However, the Court as-
sumed the act's applicability to unfair hiring
practices and, after indulging in that as-
sumption, determined that Congress did not
intend to bar state legislation.
The Court appears to have given blanket
approval to other state statutes similar in
purpose. Since state legislation cannot re-
quire discrimination, other states can only
imitate Colorado's legislation or, perhaps,
'26 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27 72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C. §§1301-1542 (195.8), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. §§1301-1542 (Supp. III,
1961).
exceed it, i.e., provide greater protection
against discrimination. This latter possi-
bility raises one of the interesting problems
which arise in discussing the effect of four-
teenth amendment legislation on the com-
merce clause2 8 since it can be argued that a
statute affording greater protection against
discrimination will constitute an undue bur-
den. To illustrate, let us assume that a
state's policy against discrimination is so
strong that it considers it in the best in-
terests of the general moral welfare of its
citizens to enact rather strong anti-discrim-
ination legislation. Let us further assume
that such a state passes a law which forbids
the marketing of any goods within its
jurisdiction if the goods are manufactured
in an industry which practices segregation.
It would appear that in this hypothetical
the fourteenth amendment and the com-
merce clause are somewhat in conflict. A
court would have to decide whether the free
interplay of commerce is a consideration
paramount to the designs of a statute which
is effectuating the mandates of the four-
teenth amendment. If the unimpeded flow
of commerce is deemed a superior national
interest then, ironically, the commerce
clause may well emerge as a constitutional
barrier to some forms of civil rights legisla-
tion.
28 For a profitable discussion of some of the con-
stitutional problems involved in enacting an anti-
discrimination statute, see Waite, Constitutionality
Of The Proposed Minnesota Fair Employment
Practices Act, 32 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1948).
